The Imperative Need for an Expeditionary Civil Reserve Air Fleet (E-CRAF)

Incorporating Civilian Mobile Aerial Port Teams (MAP-C)

Problem Statement

The United States possesses unmatched strategic airlift capacity, yet repeatedly fails at the tactical edge during contingencies, humanitarian crises, and rapid-onset disasters. The limiting factor is not aircraft availability—it is the absence of deployable, experienced aerial port and airfield control capability in austere, damaged, or non-standard operating environments.

The existing Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) model successfully augments aircraft capacity in major contingencies, but it does not provide expeditionary ground capability to open, run, and sustain airlift operations where infrastructure is degraded, hostile, or nonexistent.

This gap results in:

Bottlenecked aircraft on the ground

Unsafe ramp and cargo operations

Delayed aid delivery during the first 72–120 hours

Overreliance on overstretched active-duty units

Repeated relearning of known solutions

Operational Reality

Modern contingencies—HADR, NEOs, stability operations, partner-nation support—occur in environments characterized by:

Damaged or austere airfields

Limited host-nation capability

Mixed civilian/military aircraft flows

NGO, UN, SOF, and coalition users operating simultaneously

Time-critical logistics under political and media pressure

Aircraft without experienced expeditionary aerial port teams are liabilities, not assets.

Proposed Solution: Expeditionary CRAF (E-CRAF)

Establish an Expeditionary CRAF construct that pairs civil and commercial aircraft with pre-vetted, deployable Civil Mobile Aerial Port Teams (MAP-C) capable of immediate employment worldwide.

Core Concept

E-CRAF expands CRAF from a platform-only reserve into a platform + capability reserve, integrating:

Former military aerial port, MAPS, and airlift professionals

Civilian operators of legacy and commercial cargo aircraft

Rapidly deployable Mobile Aerial Port Teams

Modular, scalable expeditionary logistics packages

Civil Mobile Aerial Port Teams (MAP-C)

MAP-C units would provide:

Airfield opening and assessment

Ramp, cargo, and passenger control

Pallet build-up, HAZMAT, and load planning

Rotary and fixed-wing integration

LZ/DZ and non-standard airfield operations

Interface with SOF, NGOs, UN agencies, and host nations

These teams would deploy ahead of or concurrent with aircraft, eliminating the single greatest friction point in crisis airlift.

Why Civil MAP-C Is Essential

1. Speed

Civil MAP-C teams deploy faster than active-duty units constrained by force-generation cycles.

2. Experience Density

These personnel bring decades of real-world contingency operations, not just garrison training.

3. Scalability

Teams scale from:

Small NGO/HADR missions

To theater-opening operations

To sustained logistics hubs

4. Cost Efficiency

Civil MAP-C teams:

Cost less than standing military units

Are paid only when activated

Reduce aircraft idle time and mission aborts

Use Cases

FEMA / USAID disaster response

DLA contingency distribution

Combatant Command theater opening

UN and coalition humanitarian air bridges

Partner-nation airfield sustainment

Rapid reinforcement or evacuation operations

Strategic Advantages

Preserves military readiness for combat tasks

Improves first-72-hour disaster response outcomes

Enhances U.S. credibility in humanitarian leadership

Reduces reliance on ad hoc contractor solutions

Creates a vetted, accountable, surge-ready workforce

Implementation Framework

Establish MAP-C certification standards

Safety, HAZMAT, ramp ops, command & control

Pre-vet personnel and equipment

Security clearances where required

Medical and deployment readiness

Integrate into TRANSCOM / DLA / FEMA planning

Exercises, tabletop scenarios, activation protocols

Contractual activation model

Similar to CRAF stage activation

Tiered response based on severity

Conclusion

The next crisis will not wait for force generation, training pipelines, or ad hoc contractor mobilization.

An Expeditionary CRAF, incorporating Civil Mobile Aerial Port Teams, addresses the single most persistent failure point in contingency logistics: the ability to open, control, and sustain airlift operations at the point of need.

This is not a capability the United States must invent.

It already exists—it simply needs to be organized, certified, and activated. 

The Detriments of Disbanding Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons in the U.S. Air Force

Abstract

Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons (MAPS) play a critical role in the U.S. Air Force's expeditionary logistics and global mobility operations. These units handle cargo processing, passenger movement, and aerial port functions in deployed environments, enabling rapid response to contingencies. However, recent and historical inactivations of such squadrons, driven by budget constraints and restructuring, have raised concerns about diminished capabilities. This paper examines the operational, strategic, personnel, and financial detriments of disbanding MAPS, arguing that such actions undermine the Air Force's readiness and efficiency in an era of increasing global demands. Drawing on historical examples and expert analyses, it highlights how these reductions exacerbate overtasking of remaining forces, erode specialized skills, and compromise national security objectives.

Introduction

Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons are specialized units within the U.S. Air Force, primarily under Air Mobility Command (AMC), responsible for establishing and operating aerial ports in austere or forward-deployed locations. These squadrons manage the loading, unloading, and transshipment of cargo and personnel via air transport, ensuring seamless logistics support for military operations worldwide. An aerial port squadron typically includes functions such as air terminal operations, ramp services, and special handling for hazardous materials or oversized cargo.

The importance of MAPS stems from their role in enabling rapid global mobility, a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. As outlined in key Air Force doctrines, air mobility unlocks the full potential of U.S. airpower by facilitating swift deployment and sustainment of forces. However, the Air Force has periodically inactivated these squadrons as part of broader force restructuring efforts, often to address funding shortfalls or shift resources toward modernization. Notable examples include the inactivation of the 59th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron in 1992, the 84th Aerial Port Squadron in 2007, and more recently, the 45th Aerial Port Squadron in 2025. These decisions, while aimed at efficiency, carry significant detriments that this paper explores in detail.

Historical Context of Inactivations

The U.S. Air Force has undergone multiple rounds of squadron inactivations since the post-Cold War era, often as a response to budget constraints and evolving strategic priorities. For instance, the 59th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, redesignated in 1984 and tasked with providing trained professionals for aerial port operations, was inactivated in 1992 amid broader force reductions following the Gulf War. Similarly, the 84th Aerial Port Squadron, part of the 315th Airlift Wing, was deactivated in 2007 after four years of service, with its personnel redistributed to other units.

More contemporarily, the 45th Aerial Port Squadron, assigned to the 349th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base, was inactivated on August 2, 2025, after 61 years of operation. This move was part of manpower restructuring, with personnel reassigned to the 55th and 82nd Aerial Port Squadrons to maintain global mobility missions. These inactivations reflect a pattern where the Air Force retires units to free resources, but as broader analyses indicate, such actions stem from chronic underfunding. In fiscal year 2025, the Air Force sought to divest 250 aircraft while procuring only 91 replacements, exacerbating capacity shortfalls. This trend extends to support units like MAPS, where demands for steady-state operations often outpace available resources.

Operational Detriments

Disbanding MAPS directly impairs the Air Force's operational readiness and ability to conduct expeditionary missions. These squadrons are essential for low-intensity conflicts and major operations alike, as evidenced by historical contingencies such as Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama, where aerial ports faced readiness challenges due to inadequate capabilities. In modern contexts, inactivations lead to overtasking of remaining units, increasing the risk of delays in cargo throughput and mission execution.

For example, during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, aerial port units were stretched thin, with demands on specialized personnel like engineers and security forces reaching critical levels in military operations other than war (MOOTW). Reducing the number of MAPS exacerbates this strain, potentially leading to bottlenecks in global supply chains. A RAND study on global access strategies notes that high demands on aerial port squadrons in challenging environments could degrade overall mobility if units are consolidated or eliminated. Furthermore, in an age of great-power competition, the loss of mobile capabilities hinders rapid deployment to contested areas, undermining the U.S. ability to project power efficiently.

Strategic and Security Detriments

Strategically, disbanding MAPS weakens the U.S. national security posture by diminishing air mobility's role as a force multiplier. Air mobility has been pivotal in U.S. strategies since World War II, enabling responses to crises without over-reliance on fixed bases. Cuts to these units echo broader divestitures, such as those in irregular warfare capabilities, where the Air Force risks repeating historical mistakes like post-Vietnam reductions that left forces unprepared for future conflicts.

In related advisory roles, shuttering mobility support squadrons has been criticized for eroding international partnerships and burden-sharing, as seen in the proposed cuts to foreign military training units in 2025. For MAPS, similar detriments apply: fewer squadrons mean reduced capacity to support allied operations, potentially forcing reliance on less efficient alternatives and increasing vulnerability to disruptions in critical infrastructure like air bases. This could embolden adversaries by signaling diminished U.S. logistical resilience.

Personnel and Financial Detriments

On the personnel front, inactivations disrupt careers and erode institutional knowledge. When squadrons like the 45th APS are disbanded, experienced airmen are reassigned, but the loss of unit cohesion and specialized training pipelines can lead to skill atrophy. Historical precedents, such as post-World War II demobilizations, show that disbanding units leads to long-term readiness gaps, as rebuilding expertise takes years.

Financially, while inactivations aim to save costs—e.g., the 2025 advising cuts targeted $8 million in savings—the long-term expenses often outweigh benefits. Overtasking remaining squadrons increases maintenance and operational costs, while potential mission failures could incur far greater expenditures. Analyses suggest that underfunding air mobility forces results in inefficient structures unable to meet dual requirements for major wars and steady-state operations.

Conclusion

The disbanding of Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons represents a shortsighted approach to Air Force restructuring, prioritizing immediate savings over long-term capabilities. Operational detriments include reduced readiness and logistical bottlenecks, while strategic risks involve weakened global mobility and alliances. Personnel losses erode expertise, and financial trade-offs often prove counterproductive. To mitigate these issues, the Air Force should invest in sustaining and modernizing MAPS rather than inactivating them, ensuring alignment with national security demands. Reversing this trend requires congressional funding increases and a reevaluation of priorities to prevent a "capacity death spiral."

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